

**SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO  
(COMMERCIAL LIST)**

**RE:           IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT  
ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED**

**AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR  
ARRANGEMENT OF NORTEL NETWORKS CORPORATION,  
NORTEL NETWORKS LIMITED, NORTEL NETWORKS GLOBAL  
CORPORATION, NORTEL NETWORKS INTERNATIONAL  
CORPORATION AND NORTEL NETWORKS TECHNOLOGY  
CORPORATION**

**Applicants**

**APPLICATION UNDER THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS  
ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED**

**BEFORE:   MORAWETZ J.**

**COUNSEL:   Barry Wadsworth for the CAW and George Borosh et al**

**Susan Philpott and Mark Zigler for the Nortel Networks Former Employees**

**Lyndon Barnes and Adam Hirsh for the Nortel Networks Board of Directors**

**Alan Mersky and Mario Forte for Nortel Networks et al**

**Gavin H. Finlayson for the Informal Nortel Noteholders Group**

**Leanne Williams for Flextronics Inc.**

**Joseph Pasquariello and Chris Armstrong for Ernst & Young Inc., Monitor**

**Janice Payne for Recently Severed Canadian Nortel Employees (“RSCNE”)**

**Gail Misra for the CEP Union**

**J. Davis-Sydor for Brookfield Lepage Johnson Controls Facility  
Management Services**

**Henry Juroviesky for the Nortel Terminated Canadian Employees Steering  
Committee**

**Alex MacFarlane for the Official Unsecured Creditors Committee**

**M. Starnino for the Superintendent of Financial Services**

**HEARD: April 21, 2009**

### **ENDORSEMENT**

[1] The process by which claims of employees, both unionized and non-unionized, have been addressed in restructurings initiated under the *Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (the “CCAA”) has been the subject of debate for a number of years. There is uncertainty and strong divergent views have been expressed. Notwithstanding that employee claims are ultimately addressed in many CCAA proceedings, there are few reported decisions which address a number of the issues being raised in these two motions. This lack of jurisprudence may reflect that the issues, for the most part, have been resolved through negotiation, as opposed to being determined by the court in the CCAA process – which includes motions for directions, the classification of creditors’ claims, the holding and conduct of creditors’ meetings and motions to sanction a plan of compromise or arrangement.

[2] In this case, both unionized and non-unionized employee groups have brought motions for directions. This endorsement addresses both motions.

#### **Union Motion**

[3] The first motion is brought by the National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada (CAW – Canada) and its Locals 27, 1525, 1530, 1535, 1837, 1839, 1905, and/or 1915 (the “Union”) and by George Borosh on his own behalf and on behalf of all retirees of the Applicants who were formerly represented by the Union.

[4] The Union requests an order directing the Applicants (also referred to as "Nortel") to recommence certain periodic and lump sum payments which the Applicants, or any of them, are obligated to make pursuant to the CAW collective agreement (the "Collective Agreement"). The Union also seeks an order requiring the Applicants to pay to those entitled persons the payments which should have been made to them under the Collective Agreement since January 14, 2009, the date of the CCAA filing and the date of the Initial Order.

[5] The Union seeks continued payment of certain of these benefits including:

- (a) retirement allowance payments ("RAP");
- (b) voluntary retirement options ("VRO"); and
- (c) termination and severance payments.

[6] The amounts claimed by the Union are contractual entitlements under the Collective Agreement, which the Union submits are payable only after an individual's employment with the Applicants has ceased.

[7] There are approximately 101 former Union members with claims to RAP. The current value of these RAP is approximately \$2.3 million. There are approximately 180 former unionized retirees who claim similar benefits under other collective agreements.

[8] There are approximately 7 persons who may assert claims to VRO as of the date of the Initial Order. These claims amount to approximately \$202,000.

[9] There are also approximately 600 persons who may claim termination and severance pay amounts. Five of those persons are former union members.

### **Former Employee Motion**

[10] The second motion is brought by Mr. Donald Sproule, Mr. David Archibald and Mr. Michael Campbell (collectively, the "Representatives") on behalf of former employees, including pensioners, of the Applicants or any person claiming an interest under or on behalf of such former employees or pensioners and surviving spouses in receipt of a Nortel pension, or group or class of them (collectively, the "Former Employees"). The Representatives seek an order varying the Initial Order by requiring the Applicants to pay termination pay, severance pay, vacation pay and an amount equivalent to the continuation of the benefit plans during the notice period, which are required to be paid to affected Former Employees in accordance with the *Employment Standards Act, 2000* S.O. 2000 c.41 ("ESA") or any other relevant provincial employment legislation. The Representatives also seek an order varying the Initial Order by requiring the Applicants to recommence certain periodic and lump sum payments and to make payment of all periodic and lump sum payments which should have been paid since the Initial Order, which the Applicants are obligated to pay Former Employees in accordance with the statutory and contractual obligations entered into by Nortel and affected Former Employees, including the Transitional Retirement Allowance ("TRA") and any pension benefit payments Former Employees are entitled to receive in excess of the Nortel Networks Limited Managerial

and Non-negotiated Pension Plan (the "Pension Plan"). TRA is similar to RAP, but is for non-unionized retirees. There are approximately 442 individuals who may claim the TRA. The current value of TRA obligations is approximately \$18 million.

[11] The TRA and the RAP are both unregistered benefits that run concurrently with other pension entitlements and operate as time-limited supplements.

[12] In many respects, the motion of the Former Employees is not dissimilar to the CAW motion, such that the motion of the Former Employees can almost be described as a "Me too motion".

### **Background**

[13] On January 14, 2009, the Applicants were granted protection under the CCAA, pursuant to the Initial Order.

[14] Upon commencement of the CCAA proceedings, the Applicants ceased making payments of amounts that constituted or would constitute unsecured claims against the Applicants. Included were payments for termination and severance, as well as amounts under various retirement and retirement transitioning programs.

[15] The Initial Order provides:

- (a) that Nortel is entitled but not required to pay, among other things, outstanding and future wages, salaries, vacation pay, employee benefits and pension plan payments;
- (b) that Nortel is entitled to terminate the employment of or lay off any of its employees and deal with the consequences under a future plan of arrangement;
- (c) that Nortel is entitled to vacate, abandon or quit the whole but not part of any lease agreement and repudiate agreements relating to leased properties (paragraph 11);
- (d) for a stay of proceedings against Nortel;
- (e) for a suspension of rights and remedies vis-à-vis Nortel;
- (f) that during the stay period no person shall discontinue, repudiate, cease to perform any contract, agreement held by the company (paragraph 16);
- (g) that those having agreements with Nortel for the supply of goods and/or services are restrained from, among other things, discontinuing, altering or terminating the supply of such goods or services. The proviso is that the goods or services supplied are to be paid for by Nortel in accordance with the normal payment practices.

### Position of Union

[16] The position of the CAW is that the Applicants' obligations to make the payments is to the CAW pursuant to the Collective Agreement. The obligation is not to the individual beneficiaries.

[17] The Union also submits that the difference between the moving parties is that RAP, VRO and other payments are made pursuant to the Collective Agreement as between the Union and the Applicants and not as an outstanding debt payable to former employees.

[18] The Union further submits that the Applicants are obligated to maintain the full measure of compensation under the Collective Agreement in exchange for the provision of services provided by the Union's members subsequent to the issuance of the Initial Order. As such, the failure to abide by the terms of the Collective Agreement, the Union submits, runs directly contrary to Section 11.3 of the CCAA as compensation paid to employees under a collective agreement can reasonably be interpreted as being payment for services within the meaning of this section.

[19] Section 11.3 of the CCAA provides:

No order made under section 11 shall have the effect of

(a) prohibiting a person from requiring immediate payment for goods, services, use of leased or licensed property or other valuable consideration provided after the order is made; or

(b) requiring the further advance of money or credit.

[20] In order to fit within Section 11.3, services have to be provided after the date of the Initial Order.

[21] The Union submits that persons owed severance pay are post-petition trade creditors in a bankruptcy, albeit in relation to specific circumstances. Thus, by analogy, persons owed severance pay are post-petition trade creditors in a CCAA proceeding. The Union relies on *Smokey River Coal Ltd. (Re)* 2001 ABCA 209 to support its proposition.

[22] The Union further submits that when interpreting "compensation" for services performed under the Collective Agreement, it must include all of the monetary aspects of the Collective Agreement and not those specifically made to those actively employed on any particular given day.

[23] The Union takes the position that Section 11.3 of the CCAA specifically contemplates that a supplier is entitled to payment for post-filing goods and services provided, and would undoubtedly refuse to continue supply in the event of receiving only partial payment. However, the Union contends that it does not have the ability to cease providing services due to the *Labour Relations Act, 1995*, S.O. 1995, c. 1. As such, the only alternative open to the Union is to seek an order to recommence the payments halted by the Initial Order.

[24] The Union contends that Section 11.3 of the CCAA precludes the court from authorizing the Applicants to make selective determinations as to which parts of the Collective Agreement it will abide by. By failing to abide by the terms of the Collective Agreement, the Union contends that the Applicants have acted as if the contract has been amended to the extent that it is no longer bound by all of its terms and need merely address any loss through the plan of arrangement.

[25] The Union submits that, with the exception of rectification to clarify the intent of the parties, the court has no jurisdiction at common law or in equity to alter the terms of the contract between parties and as the court cannot amend the terms of the Collective Agreement, the employer should not be allowed to act as though it had done so.

[26] The Union submits that no other supplier of services would countenance, and the court does not have the jurisdiction to authorize, the recipient party to a contract unilaterally determining which provisions of the agreement it will or will not abide by while the contract is in operation.

[27] The Union concludes that the Applicants must pay for the full measure of its bargain with the Union while the Collective Agreement remains in force and the court should direct the recommencement and repayment of those benefits that arise out of the Collective Agreement and which were suspended subsequently to the filing of the CCAA application on January 14, 2009.

#### **Position of the Former Employees**

[28] Counsel to the Former Employees submits that the court has the discretion pursuant to Section 11 of the CCAA to order Nortel to recommence periodic and lump-sum payments to Former Employees in accordance with Nortel's statutory and contractual obligations. Further, the RAP payments which the Union seeks to enforce are not meaningfully different from those RAP benefits payable to other unionized retirees who belong to other unions nor from the TRA payable to non-unionized former employees. Accordingly, counsel submits that it would be inequitable to restore payments to one group of retirees and not others. Hence, the reference to the "Me too motion".

[29] Counsel further submits that all employers and employees are bound by the minimum standards in the ESA and other applicable provincial employment legislation. Section 5 of the ESA expressly states that no employer can contract out or waive an employment standard in the ESA and that any such contracting out or waiver is void.

[30] Counsel submits that each province has minimum standards employment legislation and regulations which govern employment relationships at the provincial level and that provincial laws such as the ESA continue to apply during CCAA proceedings.

[31] Further, the Supreme Court of Canada has held that provincial laws in federally-regulated bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings continue to apply so long as the doctrine of paramountcy is not triggered: See *Crystalline Investments Ltd. v. Domgroup Ltd.*, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 60.

[32] In this case, counsel further submits that there is no conflict between the provisions of the ESA and the CCAA and that paramountcy is not triggered and it follows that the ESA and other applicable employment legislation continues to apply during the Applicants' CCAA proceedings. As a result counsel submits that the Applicants are required to make payment to Former Employees for monies owing pursuant to the minimum employment standards as outlined in the ESA and other applicable provincial legislation.

### **Position of the Applicants**

[33] Counsel to the Applicants sets out the central purpose of the CCAA as being: "to facilitate the making of a compromise or arrangement between an insolvent debtor company and its creditors to the end that the company is able to continue in business". (*Pacific National Lease Holding Corp. (Re)*, (1992) B.C.J. No. 3070, aff'd by 1992, 15 C.B.R. (3d) 265), and that the stay is the primary procedural instrument used to achieve the purpose of the CCAA:

...if the attempt at a compromise or arrangement is to have any prospect of success, there must be a means of holding the creditors at bay. Hence the powers vested in the court under Section 11 (*Pacific National Lease Holding Corp. (Re)*, *supra*).

[34] The Applicants go on to submit that the powers vested in the court under Section 11 to achieve these goals of the CCAA include:

- (a) the ability to stay past debts; and
- (b) the ability to require the continuance of present obligations to the debtor.

[35] The corresponding protection extended to persons doing business with the debtor is that such persons (including employees) are not required to extend credit to the debtor corporation in the course of the CCAA proceedings. The protection afforded by Section 11.3 extends only to services provided after the Initial Order. Post-filing payments are only made for the purpose of ensuring the continued supply of services and that obligations in connection with past services are stayed. (See *Mirant Canada Energy Marketing Ltd. (Re)* (2004), A.J. No. 331).

[36] Furthermore, counsel to the Applicants submits that contractual obligations respecting post employment are obligations in respect of past services and are accordingly stayed.

[37] Counsel to the Applicants also relies on the following statement from *Mirant, supra*, at paragraph 28:

Thus, for me to find the decision of the Court of Appeal in Smokey River Coal analogous to Schaefer's situation, I would need to find that the obligation to pay severance pay to Schaefer was a clear contractual obligation that was necessary for Schaefer to continue his employment and not an obligation that arose from the cessation or termination of services. In my view, to find it to be the former would be to stretch the meaning of the obligation in the Letter Agreement to pay severance pay. It is an obligation that arises on the termination of services. It

does not fall within a commercially reasonable contractual obligation essential for the continued supply of services. Only is his salary which he has been paid falls within that definition.

[38] Counsel to the Applicants states that post-employment benefits have been consistently stayed under the CCAA and that post-employment benefits are properly regarded as pre-filing debts, which receive the same treatment as other unsecured creditors. The Applicants rely on *Syndicat nationale de l'amiante d'Asbestos inc. v. Jeffrey Mines Inc.* (2003) Q.J. No. 264 (C.A.) ("*Jeffrey Mine*") for the proposition that "the fact that these benefits are provided for in the collective agreement changes nothing".

[39] Counsel to the Applicants submits that the Union seeks an order directing the Applicants to make payment of various post-employment benefits to former Nortel employees and that the Former Employees claim entitlement to similar treatment for all post-employment benefits, under the Collective Agreement or otherwise.

[40] The Applicants take the position the Union's continuing collective representation role does not clothe unpaid benefits with any higher status, relying on the following from *Jeffrey Mine* at paras. 57 – 58:

Within the framework of the restructuring plan, arrangements can be made respecting the amounts owing in this regard.

The same is true in the case of the loss of certain fringe benefits sustained by persons who have not provided services to the debtor since the initial order. These persons became creditors of the debtor for the monetary value of the benefits lost further to Jeffrey Mines Inc.'s having ceased to pay premiums. The fact that these benefits are provided for in the collective agreements changes nothing.

[41] In addition, the Applicants point to the following statement of the Quebec Court of Appeal in *Syndicat des employées et employés de CFAP-TV (TQS-Quebec), section locale 3946 du Syndicat canadien de la fonction publique c. TQS inc.*, 2008 QCCA 1429 at paras. 26-27:

[Unofficial translation] Employees' rights are defined by the collective agreement that governs them and by certain legislative provisions. However, the resulting claims are just as much [at] risk as those of other creditors, in this case suppliers whose livelihood is also threatened by the financial precariousness of their debtor.

The arguments of counsel for the Applicants are based on the erroneous premise that the employees are entitled to a privileged status. That is not what the CCAA provides nor is it what this court decided in *Syndicat national de l'amiante d'Asbestos inc. c. Mine Jeffrey inc.*



[42] Collectively, RAP payment and TRA payments entail obligations of over \$22 million. Counsel to the Applicants submits that there is no basis in principle to treat them differently. They are all stayed and there is no basis to treat any of these two unsecured obligations differently. The Applicants are attempting to restructure for the final benefit of all stakeholders and counsel submits that its collective resources must be used for such purposes.

### **Report of the Monitor**

[43] In its Seventh Report, the Monitor notes that at the time of the Initial Order, the Applicants employed approximately 6,000 employees and had approximately 11,700 retirees or their survivors receiving pension and/or benefits from retirement plans sponsored by the Applicants.

[44] The Monitor goes on to report that the Applicants have continued to honour substantially all of the obligations to active employees. The Applicants have continued to make current service and special funding payments to their registered pension plans. All the health and welfare benefits for both active employees and retirees have been continued to be paid since the commencement of the CCAA proceedings.

[45] The Monitor further reports that at the filing date, payments to former employees for termination and severance as well as the provisions of the health and dental benefits ceased. In addition, non-registered and unfunded retirement plan payments ceased.

[46] More importantly, the Monitor reports that, as noted in previous Monitor's Reports, the Applicants' financial position is under pressure.

### **Discussion and Analysis**

[47] The acknowledged purpose of the CCAA is to facilitate the making of a compromise or arrangement between an insolvent debtor company and its creditors to the end that the company is able to continue in business. (See *Pacific National Lease Holding Corp. (Re)*, (1992) B.C.J. No. 3070, aff'd by (1992), 15 C.B.R. (3d) 265, at para. 18 citing *Chef Ready Foods Ltd. v. Hongkong Bank of Canada* (1990), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311 (B.C.C.A.) at 315). The primary procedural instrument used to achieve that goal is the ability of the court to issue a broad stay of proceedings under Section 11 of the CCAA.

[48] The powers vested in the court under Section 11 of the CCAA to achieve these goals include the ability to stay past debts; and the ability to require the continuance of present obligations to the debtor. (*Woodwards Limited (Re)*, (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 236 (S.C.)).

[49] The Applicants acknowledged that they were insolvent in affidavit material filed on the Initial Hearing. This position was accepted and is referenced in my endorsement of January 14, 2009. The Applicants are in the process of restructuring but no plan of compromise or arrangement has yet to be put forward.

[50] The Monitor has reported that the Applicants are under financial pressure. Previous reports filed by the Monitor have provided considerable detail as to how the Applicants carry on

operations and have provided specific information as to the interdependent relationship between Nortel entities in Canada, the United States, Europe, the Middle East and Asia.

[51] In my view, in considering the impact of these motions, it is both necessary and appropriate to take into account the overall financial position of the Applicants. There are several reasons for doing so:

- (a) The Applicants are not in a position to honour their obligations to all creditors.
- (b) The Applicants are in default of contractual obligations to a number of creditors, including with respect to significant bond issues. The obligations owed to bondholders are unsecured.
- (c) The Applicants are in default of certain obligations under the Collective Agreements.
- (d) The Applicants are in default of certain obligations owed to the Former Employees.

[52] It is also necessary to take into account that these motions have been brought prior to any determination of any creditor classifications. No claims procedure has been proposed. No meeting of creditors has been called and no plan of arrangement has been presented to the creditors for their consideration.

[53] There is no doubt that the views of the Union and the Former Employees differ from that of the Applicants. The Union insists that the Applicants honour the Collective Agreement. The Former Employees want treatment that is consistent with that being provided to the Union. The record also establishes that the financial predicament faced by retirees and Former Employees is, in many cases, serious. The record references examples where individuals are largely dependent upon the employee benefits that, until recently, they were receiving.

[54] However, the Applicants contend that since all of the employee obligations are unsecured it is improper to prefer retirees and the Former Employees over the other unsecured creditors of the Applicants and furthermore, the financial pressure facing the Applicants precludes them from paying all of these outstanding obligations.

[55] Counsel to the Union contends that the Applicants must pay for the full measure of its bargain with the Union while the Collective Agreement remains in force and further that the court does not have the jurisdiction to authorize a party, in this case the Applicants, to unilaterally determine which provisions of the Collective Agreement they will abide by while the contract is in operation. Counsel further contends that Section 11.3 of the CCAA precludes the court from authorizing the Applicants to make selective determinations as to which parts of the Collective Agreement they will abide by and that by failing to abide by the terms of the Collective Agreement, the Applicants acted as if the Collective Agreement between themselves and the Union has been amended to the extent that the Applicants are no longer bound by all of its terms and need merely address any loss through the plan of arrangement.

[56] The Union specifically contends that the court has no jurisdiction to alter the terms of the Collective Agreement.

[57] In addressing these points, it is necessary to keep in mind that these CCAA proceedings are at a relatively early stage. It also must be kept in mind that the economic circumstances at Nortel are such that it cannot be considered to be carrying on "business as usual". As a result of the Applicants' insolvency, difficult choices will have to be made. These choices have to be made by all stakeholders.

[58] The Applicants have breached the Collective Agreement and, as a consequence, the Union has certain claims.

[59] However, the Applicants have also breached contractual agreements they have with Former Employees and other parties. These parties will also have claims as against the Applicants.

[60] An overriding consideration is that the employee claims whether put forth by the Union or the Former Employees, are unsecured claims. These claims do not have any statutory priority.

[61] In addition, there is nothing on the record which addresses the issue of how the claims of various parties will be treated in any plan of arrangement, nor is there any indication as to how the creditors will be classified. These issues are not before the court at this time.

[62] What is before the court is whether the Applicants should be directed to recommence certain periodic and lump sum payments that they are obligated to make under the Collective Agreement as well as similar or equivalent payments to Former Employees.

[63] It is necessary to consider the meaning of Section 11.3 and, in particular, whether the Section should be interpreted in the manner suggested by the Union.

[64] Counsel to the Union submits that the ordinary meaning of "services" in section 11.3 includes work performed by employees subject to a collective agreement. Further, even if the ordinary meaning is plain, courts must consider the purpose and scheme of the legislation, and relevant legal norms. Counsel submits that the courts must consider the entire context. As a result, when interpreting "compensation" for services performed under a collective agreement, counsel to the Union submits it must include all of the monetary aspects of the agreement and not those made specifically to those actively employed on any particular given day.

[65] No cases were cited in support of this interpretation.

[66] I am unable to agree with the Union's argument. In my view, section 11.3 is an exception to the general stay provision authorized by section 11 provided for in the Initial Order. As such, it seems to me that section 11.3 should be narrowly construed. (See Ruth Sullivan, *Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes*, 5<sup>th</sup> ed. (Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2008) at 483-485.) Section 11.3 applies to services provided after the date of the Initial Order. The ordinary meaning of "services" must be considered in the context of the phrase "services,...provided after the order is made". On a plain reading, it contemplates, in my view,

some activity on behalf of the service provider which is performed after the date of the Initial Order. The CCAA contemplates that during the reorganization process, pre-filing debts are not paid, absent exceptional circumstances and services provided after the date of the Initial Order will be paid for the purpose of ensuring the continued supply of services.

[67] The flaw in the argument of the Union is that it equates the crystallization of a payment obligation under the Collective Agreement to a provision of a service within the meaning of s. 11.3. The triggering of the payment obligation may have arisen after the Initial Order but it does not follow that a service has been provided after the Initial Order. Section 11.3 contemplates, in my view, some current activity by a service provider post-filing that gives rise to a payment obligation post-filing. The distinction being that the claims of the Union for termination and severance pay are based, for the most part, on services that were provided pre-filing. Likewise, obligations for benefits arising from RAP and VRO are again based, for the most part, on services provided pre-filing. The exact time of when the payment obligation crystallized is not, in my view, the determining factor under section 11.3. Rather, the key factor is whether the employee performed services after the date of the Initial Order. If so, he or she is entitled to compensation benefits for such current service.

[68] The interpretation urged by counsel to the Union with respect to this section is not warranted. In my view, section 11.3 does not require the Applicants to make payment, at this time, of the outstanding obligations under the Collective Agreement.

[69] The Union also raised the issue as to whether the court has the jurisdiction to order a stay of the outstanding obligations under Section 11 of the CCAA.

[70] The Union takes the position that, with the exception of rectification to clarify the intent of the parties, the court has no jurisdiction at common law or in equity to alter the terms of a contract between parties. The Union relies on *Bilodeau et al v. McLean*, [1924] 3 D.L.R. 410 (Man. C.A.); *Desener v. Myles*, [1963] S. J. No. 31 (Q.B.); *Hiesinger v. Bonice* [1984] A. J. No. 281; *Werchola v. KC5 Amusement Holdings Ltd.* 2002 SKQB 339 to support its position.

[71] The Union extends this argument and submits that as the court cannot amend the terms of a collective agreement, the employer should not be allowed to act as though it had been.

[72] As a general rule, counsel to the Union submits, there is in place a comprehensive regime for the regulation of labour relations with specialized labour-relations tribunals having exclusive jurisdiction to deal with legal and factual matters arising under labour legislation and no court should restrain any tribunal from proceeding to deal with such matters.

[73] However, as is clear from the context, these cases referenced at [70] are dealing with the ordinary situation in which there is no issue of insolvency. In this case, we are dealing with a group of companies which are insolvent and which have been accorded the protection of the CCAA. In my view, this insolvency context is an important distinguishing factor. The insolvency context requires that the stay provisions provided in the CCAA and the Initial Order must be given meaningful interpretation.

[74] There is authority for the proposition that, when exercising their authority under insolvency legislation, the courts may make, at the initial stage of a CCAA proceeding, orders regarding matters, but for the insolvent condition of the employer, would be dealt with pursuant to provincial labour legislation, and in most circumstances, by labour tribunals. In *Re: Pacific National Lease Holding Corp.* (1992) 15 C.B.R. (3d) 265 (B.C.C.A.), the issue involved the question whether a CCAA debtor company had to make statutory severance payments as was mandatory under the provincial employment standards legislation. MacFarlane J.A. stated at pp. 271-2:

It appears to me that an order which treats creditors alike is in accord with the purpose of the CCAA. Without the provisions of that statute the petitioner companies might soon be in bankruptcy, and the priority which the employees now have would be lost. The process provided by the CCAA is an interim one. Generally, it suspends but does not determine the ultimate rights of any creditor. In the end it may result in the rights of employees being protected, but in the meantime it preserves the status quo and protects all creditors while a reorganization is being attempted.

...

This case is not so much about the rights of employees as creditors, but the right of the court under the CCAA to serve not only the special interests of the directors and officers of the company but the broader constituency referred to in *Chef Ready Foods Ltd., supra*. Such a decision may invariably conflict with provincial legislation, but the broad purpose of the CCAA must be served.

[75] The *Jeffrey Mine* decision is also relevant. In my view, the *Jeffrey Mine* case does not appear to support the argument that the Collective Agreement is to be treated as being completely unaffected by CCAA proceedings. It seems to me that it is contemplated that rights under a collective agreement may be suspended during the CCAA proceedings. At paragraphs 60 – 62, the court said under the heading Recapitulation (in translation):

The collective agreements continue to apply like any contract of successive performance not modified by mutual agreement after the initial order or not disclaimed (assuming that to be possible in the case of collective agreements). Neither the monitor nor the court can amend them unilaterally. That said, distinctions need to be made with regard to the prospect of the resulting debts.

Thus, unionized employees kept on or recalled are entitled to be paid immediately by the monitor for any service provided after the date of the order (s. 11.3), in accordance with the terms of the original version of the applicable collective agreement by the union concerned. However, the obligations not honoured by Jeffrey Mine Inc. with regard to services provided prior to the order constitute debts of Jeffrey Mine Inc. for which the monitor cannot be held liable (s. 11.8 CCAA) and which the employees cannot demand to be paid immediately (s. 11.3 CCAA).

Obligations that have not been met with regard to employees who were laid off permanently on October 7, 2002, or with regard to persons who were former employees of Jeffrey Mine Inc. on that date and that stem from the collective agreements or other commitments constitute debts of the debtor to be disposed of in the restructuring plan or, failing that, upon the bankruptcy of Jeffrey Mine Inc.

[76] The issue of severance pay benefits was also referenced in *Communications, Energy, Paperworks, Local 721G v. Printwest Communications Ltd.* 2005 SKQB 331 at paras. 11 and 15. The application of the Union was rejected:

...The claims for severance pay arise from the collective bargaining agreement. But severance pay does not fall into the category of essential services provided during the organization period in order to enable Printwest to function.

...

If the Union's request should be accepted, with the result that the claims for severance pay be dealt with outside the plan of compromise – and thereby be paid in full – such a result could not possibly be viewed as fair and reasonable with respect to other unsecured creditors, who will possibly receive only a small fraction of the amounts owing to them for goods and services provided to Printwest in good faith. Thus, the application of the Union in this respect must be rejected.

### **Disposition**

[77] At the commencement of an insolvency process, the situation is oftentimes fluid. An insolvent debtor is faced with many uncertainties. The statute is aimed at facilitating a plan of compromise or arrangement. This may require adjustments to the operations in a number of areas, one of which may be a downsizing of operations which may involve a reduction in the workforce. These adjustments may be painful but at the same time may be unavoidable. The alternative could very well be a bankruptcy which would leave former employees, both unionized and non-unionized, in the position of having unsecured claims against a bankrupt debtor. Depending on the status of secured claims, these unsecured claims may, subject to benefits arising from the recently enacted *Wage Earner Protection Program Act*, be worth next to nothing.

[78] In the days ahead, the Applicants, former employees, both unionized and non-unionized may very well have arguments to make on issues involving claims processes (including the ability of the Applicants to compromise claims), classification, meeting of creditors and plan sanction. Nothing in this endorsement is intended to restrict the rights of any party to raise these issues.

[79] The reorganization process under the CCAA can be both long and painful. Ultimately, however, for a plan to be sanctioned by the court, the application must meet the following three tests:

- (i) there has to be strict compliance with all statutory requirements and adherence to previous orders of the court;
- (ii) nothing has been done or purported to be done that is not authorized by the CCAA;
- (iii) the plan is fair and reasonable. *Re: Sammi Atlas Inc.* (1998), 3 C.B.R. (4<sup>th</sup>) 171 (Ont. Gen. Div.)

[80] At this stage of the Applicants' CCAA process, I see no basis in principle to treat either unionized or non-unionized employees differently than other unsecured creditors of the Applicants. Their claims are all stayed. The Applicants are attempting to restructure for the benefit of all stakeholders and their resources should be used for such a purpose.

[81] It follows that the motion of the Union is dismissed.

[82] The Applicants also raised the issue that the Union consistently requested the right to bargain on behalf of retirees who were once part of the Union and that the concession had not been granted. Consequently, the retirees' substantive rights are not part of the bargain between the unionized employees and the employer. Counsel to the Applicants submitted that the union may collectively alter the existing rights of any employee but it cannot negatively do so with respect to retirees' rights.

[83] The Union countered that the rights gained by a member of the bargaining unit vest upon retirement, despite the fact that a collective agreement expires, and are enforceable through the grievance procedure.

[84] Both parties cited *Dayco (Canada) Ltd. v. National Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers Union of Canada (CAW-Canada)* [1993] 2 S.C.R. 230 in support of their respective positions.

[85] In view of the fact that this motion has been dismissed for other reasons, it is not necessary for me to determine this specific issue arising out of the *Dayco* decision.

[86] The motion of the Former Employees was characterized, as noted above, as a "Me too motion". It was based on the premise that, if the Union's motion was successful, it would only be equitable if the Former Employees also received benefits. The Former Employees do not have the benefit of any enhanced argument based on the Collective Agreement. Rather, the argument of the Former Employees is based on the position that the Applicants cannot contract out of the ESA or any other provincial equivalent. In my view, this is not a case of contracting out of the ESA. Rather, it is a case of whether immediate payout resulting from a breach of the ESA is required to be made. In my view, the analysis is not dissimilar from the Collective Agreement scenario. There is an acknowledgment of the applicability of the ESA, but during the

stay period, the Former Employees cannot enforce the payment obligation. In the result, it follows that the motion of the Former Employees is also dismissed.

[87] However, I am also mindful that the record, as I have previously noted, makes reference to a number of individuals that are severely impacted by the cessation of payments. There are no significant secured creditors of the Applicants, outside of certain charges provided for in the CCAA proceedings, and in view of the Applicants' declared assets, it is reasonable to expect that there will be a meaningful distribution to unsecured creditors, including retirees and Former Employees. The timing of such distribution may be extremely important to a number of retirees and Former Employees who have been severely impacted by the cessation of payments. In my view, it would be both helpful and equitable if a partial distribution could be made to affected employees on a timely basis.

[88] In recognition of the circumstances that face certain retirees and Former Employees, the Monitor is directed to review the current financial circumstances of the Applicants and report back as to whether it is feasible to establish a process by which certain creditors, upon demonstrating hardship, could qualify for an unspecified partial distribution in advance of a general distribution to creditors. I would ask that the Monitor consider and report back to this court on this issue within 30 days.

[89] This decision may very well have an incidental effect on the Collective Agreement and the provisions of the ESA, but it is one which arises from the stay. It does not, in my view, result from a repudiation of the Collective Agreement or a contracting out of the ESA. The stay which is being recognized is, in my view, necessary in the circumstances. To hold otherwise, would have the effect of frustrating the objectives of the CCAA to the detriment of all stakeholders.



MORAWETZ J.

DATE: June 18, 2009